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Freeing Racial Harassment from the Sexual
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Pat K. Chew
Abstract
Judges, academics, and lawyers alike base their legal analyses of workplace racial
harassment on the sexual harassment model. Legal principles derived from sexual
harassment jurisprudence are presumed to be equally appropriate for racial ha-
rassment cases. The implicit assumption is that the social harms and public policy
goals of racial harassment and sexual harassment are sufficiently similar to jus-
tify analogous scrutiny and remedies. Parties to racial harassment cases cite the
reasoning and elements of sexual harassment cases without hesitation, as if racial
harassment and sexual harassment are behaviorally and legally indistinguishable.
This Article, however, questions the assumption that there should be a mono-
lithic model for discriminatory workplace harassment. In particular, it questions
whether the currently dominant sexual harassment model should be used automat-
ically as the paradigm in racial harassment disputes. Part I begins by acknowledg-
ing and explaining why the legal community analogizes racial harassment claims
and jurisprudence to sexual harassment claims and jurisprudence. Part II posits
that this analogy is problematic given the fundamental differences between racial
harassment and sexual harassment. While empirical evidence of these differences
is currently limited, Part II identifies and discusses two pioneering examples. The
first documents important dissimilarities between racial harassment litigation and
sexual harassment litigation; the second chronicles the differences between the
dynamics and theoretical explanations for racial harassment and sexual harass-
ment in the law firm context.
Given the dominance of the sexual harassment model and the presumption of its
applicability to other harassment disputes, including racial harassment, it is not
surprising that comparatively little research and study of racial harassment and
other forms of harassment have been done. The discussion and analysis here con-
tributes to the research on the topic. Finally, Part III explores the implications of
freeing racial harassment from the sexual harassment model.
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Freeing Racial Harassment from the Sexual Harassment Model 
 
Judges, academics, and lawyers alike base their legal 
analyses of workplace racial harassment on the sexual harassment 
model.  Legal principles derived from sexual harassment 
jurisprudence are presumed to be equally appropriate for racial 
harassment cases.  The implicit assumption is that the social 
harms and public policy goals of racial harassment and sexual 
harassment are sufficiently similar to justify analogous 
scrutiny and remedies.  Parties to racial harassment cases cite 
the reasoning and elements of sexual harassment cases without 
hesitation, as if racial harassment and sexual harassment are 
behaviorally and legally indistinguishable. 
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This Article, however, questions the assumption that there 
should be a monolithic model for discriminatory workplace 
harassment.  In particular, it questions whether the currently 
dominant sexual harassment model should be used automatically as 
the paradigm in racial harassment disputes.  Part I begins by 
acknowledging and explaining why the legal community analogizes 
racial harassment claims and jurisprudence to sexual harassment 
claims and jurisprudence.  Part II posits that this analogy is 
problematic given the fundamental differences between racial 
harassment and sexual harassment.  While empirical evidence of 
these differences is currently limited, Part II identifies and 
discusses two pioneering examples.  The first documents 
important dissimilarities between racial harassment litigation 
and sexual harassment litigation; the second chronicles the 
differences between the dynamics and theoretical explanations 
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for racial harassment and sexual harassment in the law firm 
context. 
Given the dominance of the sexual harassment model and the 
presumption of its applicability to other harassment disputes, 
including racial harassment, it is not surprising that 
comparatively little research and study of racial harassment and 
other forms of harassment have been done. The discussion and 
analysis here contributes to the research on the topic.  
Finally, Part III explores the implications of freeing racial 
harassment from the sexual harassment model. 
I
Understanding the Analogy 
A. Analogizing Racial Harassment and Sexual Harassment 
The preeminent legislative purpose of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 was to rectify racial discrimination; the last-minute 
inclusion of gender discrimination was reported as a desperate 
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attempt to defeat the proposed legislation.1 Similarly, the 
judiciary first recognized the harassment doctrine under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act in a landmark racial harassment 
case,2 not in a sexual harassment case. 
Scholars such as Catharine MacKinnon and Lin Farley, 
however, reframed workplace harassment as sexual harassment, 
introducing a provocative conceptual model for sexual harassment 
as impermissible intentional discrimination.3 An extensive and 
impressive array of other scholars continued to develop the 
legal and public policy issues of sexual harassment, thus 
further establishing sexual harassment as the paradigm for 
harassment in the workplace.4 Also, a line of important Supreme 
Court cases began drawing the jurisprudential principles for 
harassment law in the context of sexual harassment disputes, 
beginning with Meritor and continuing with the Harris, Oncale,
Ellerth, and Faragher cases.5 In addition, the public has been 
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mesmerized by highly publicized and tantalizing stories of 
sexual harassment.6 Fueled in part by these events, the study of 
sexual harassment as a social phenomenon and the development of 
sexual harassment jurisprudence has significantly evolved.  
 Sexual harassment has considerable public and academic 
visibility.  Employee training programs on “what is sexual 
harassment” are widespread.  In contrast, despite its prominence 
in Title VII’s legislative history and its ongoing social 
pervasiveness, the study of racial harassment and its 
jurisprudence has languished.  In comparison to sexual 
harassment, research on racial harassment is minuscule.7
The lack of a distinctive jurisprudential model for racial 
harassment, however, has not prompted jurists or others to 
propose one.  Instead, they simply apply the legal principles 
developed in the context of sexual harassment to complaints of 
racial harassment.8 It appears they view the jurisprudential 
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model for workplace harassment as monolithic, and that the 
monolithic model should be the one designed for sexual 
harassment. 
 It is not surprising that federal courts take this 
approach, given the Supreme Court’s implicit endorsement.  In 
its recognition of sexual harassment as a violation of Title 
VII, Justice Rehnquist draws direct parallels to racial 
harassment.9 Quoting from Henson v. Dundee, Justice Rehnquist 
wrote: 
Sexual harassment . . . is every bit the 
arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace 
that racial harassment is to racial equality.  Surely, 
a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of 
sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being 
allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning 
and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.10 
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Justice Ginsburg, concurring in Harris, also pointedly refers to 
the equivalency of sexual and racial harassment jurisprudence.11 
B. Rationalizing the Analogy 
Analogizing racial harassment claims to sexual harassment 
claims is not totally unreasonable.  Analogizing from one type 
of fact pattern to another and from one type of claim to another 
is a fundamental analytic tool of lawyers and academics.12 
Social scientists also observe that there is the human tendency 
to analogize and generalize.13 When one is confronted with an 
unfamiliar or complex situation, he or she tries to make sense 
and create order by comparing the circumstances to what is 
familiar and by simplifying the issues to what is 
understandable.   
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In addition to these more generic legal and human 
tendencies to analogize, particular reasons to analogize in the 
context of racial and sexual harassment exist.  Both types of 
harassment claims originate from the same legislative source and 
share the common goal of eliminating a hostile working 
environment for those who have historically been disadvantaged 
in employment.14 Both victims of sexual harassment and victims 
of racial harassment are deprived of the right to a 
nondiscriminatory working environment and are debilitated by 
that deprivation.15 
Analogizing racial harassment (and other forms of 
harassment) to sexual harassment also serves varied political 
agendas.  For instance, politicians who believe that Title VII 
and other antidiscrimination laws should be interpreted 
restrictively may find that confining harassment claims to one 
monolithic model is an expedient way to limit protection of 
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disadvantaged groups.  All harassment claims, no matter their 
character, would be tied to the same set of requirements.  To 
the extent that those requirements are burdensome, all claims 
would be similarly burdened.16 
Feminist activist scholars also may prefer that sexual 
harassment retain center stage.  Given that women are the most 
likely targets of sexual harassment, ongoing scholarship on and 
judicial attention to sexual harassment would better serve a 
feminist political agenda.  The research on sexual harassment is 
focused on the rights of women and tends to take into account 
race only when it is framed as a variant of sexual harassment.17 
II 
 The Problem with the Analogy 
Despite these rational reasons for so believing, the 
assumption that the legal analysis for sexual harassment and 
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racial harassment should be the same is untested.  Given the 
pervasiveness of racial harassment in the workplace and the 
increasing number of racial harassment lawsuits, it seems 
imperative to question this assumption. 
Furthermore, L. Camille Hébert asserts that analogizing 
racial harassment cases to sexual harassment cases may bolster 
the sexual harassment plaintiffs’ claims, but analogizing sexual 
harassment cases to racial harassment claims may have the 
opposite result for racial harassment plaintiffs.18 She notes 
characteristics of sexual harassment jurisprudence:  courts 
require plaintiffs show the harassment was “unwelcome,” impose a 
very high standard for “severe or pervasive” harassment, defer 
to a “gender-neutral” rather than a “reasonable woman’s” 
perspective of what constitutes harassment, and find even 
explicit sexually related behavior to be not motivated by sex.19 
Importing these standards into racial harassment classes, 
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Professor Hébert argues, might be inappropriate and might harm 
legitimate racial harassment claims.20 A recent study of racial 
harassment cases suggests that Hébert’s concerns are justified.  
The study indicates that courts in racial harassment cases do 
indeed impose a very high standard for “severe or pervasive” 
harassment, defer to a race-neutral perspective on what 
constitutes harassment, and find even explicit racially related 
harassment to be not motivated by race.21 
Moreover, one would guess intuitively that sex 
discrimination (including sexual harassment) and race 
discrimination (including racial harassment) are fundamentally 
different social phenomena with distinct causes, manifestations, 
and remedies.  Simply put, prejudice on the basis of gender is 
not the same as prejudice on the basis of race.22 Given these 
fundamental differences, one would also guess that racial 
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harassment litigation and sexual harassment litigation are 
distinctive. 
Like many things that seem obvious on their face, 
substantiating an intuition with empirical evidence that racial 
harassment and sexual harassment are distinct is challenging.  
While there is some research contrasting sex discrimination and 
race discrimination in general,23 there is surprisingly little 
that expressly studies the differences between sexual harassment 
and racial harassment.  In theory, one also could identify 
studies on sexual harassment and studies on racial harassment 
and look for appropriate ways to compare the data gathered in 
these studies.  However, the paucity of racial harassment 
research limits this approach. 
There is one study, however, that compares sexual 
harassment and racial harassment in law firms.  In addition, 
there are two empirical studies, one on sexual harassment 
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litigation and one on racial harassment litigation, that enable 
a comparison of the plaintiffs’ profiles and the judicial 
outcomes in each type of lawsuit.  While more study of this 
topic would be helpful, this emerging research clearly 
illustrates that there are fundamental differences between the 
two forms of harassment.  As the evidence below indicates, 
racial harassment litigation and sexual harassment litigation 
are distinguishable in very fundamental ways.  As this Article 
will subsequently discuss, theories explaining sexual harassment 
and racial harassment in law firms are distinct.  These 
dissimilarities evidence the problem with automatically 
analogizing between the two types of harassments. 
 
A. Racial Harassment Litigation and Sexual Harassment 
Litigation 
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Ann Juliano and Stewart Schwab studied all federal sexual 
harassment cases between 1986 and 1996.24 In a separate research 
project, Robert Kelley and I analyzed a representative sample of 
all federal racial harassment cases between 1976 and 2002.25 
Among other topics, these studies consider the plaintiffs and 
judicial outcomes in these lawsuits.  A comparative analysis of 
these two studies reveals striking variations between sexual 
harassment and racial harassment cases:26 Gender and racial 
profiles of the plaintiffs in the two types of cases contrast; 
judges in the two types of cases reach dramatically different 
conclusions about whether harassment occurred. 
 
1. Distinctive Plaintiffs’ Profiles 
Table 1 shows that the plaintiffs’ gender profile in racial 
harassment cases contrasts dramatically with the plaintiffs’ 
gender profile in sexual harassment cases.  This research 
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indicates that men are slightly more likely than women to be the 
plaintiffs in racial harassment lawsuits, while women are almost 
always the plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases. 
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Table 1.  Characteristics of Racial Harassment and Sexual Harassment Cases27 
As % of All Racial 
Harassment Cases 
(N of 
Cases) 
As % of All Sexual 
Harassment Cases 
(N of 
Cases) 
Plaintiffs’ Gender:
Women 
Men 
 
41.5 
58.5 
 
(108) 
(152) 
 
94.8 
 5.2
(616) 
(34) 
Plaintiffs’ Race:
African American 
Hispanic American 
Asian American 
Native American 
White American 
 
81.6 
 4.7 
 4.7 
 .4 
 8.6 
 
(191) 
(11) 
(11) 
(1) 
(20) 
 
51.9 
17.0 
 2.8 
 .9
27.4 
 
(55) 
(18) 
(3) 
(1) 
(29) 
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Table 2.  Gender and Race as Percentage of Labor Force28 
Gender: 
 Women 
 Men 
 
46.6 
53.4 
Race: 
 African American 
 Hispanic American 
 Asian American 
 Native American 
 White American 
 
11.9 
 13.4
3.9 
 .9
70.0 
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In racial harassment cases, 58.5% of the plaintiffs are men 
and 41.5% are women.  These percentages approximate the gender 
ratio in the general labor force, which is shown in Table 2, 
suggesting that racial harassers do not disproportionately 
target individuals of either sex.  In the alternative, it could 
be that these percentages in racial harassment cases 
underestimate the number of women who are actually harassed. 
First, there is evidence that women are more hesitant than men 
to complain.29 Second, plaintiffs who are targets of both sexual 
and racial harassment may not file a racial harassment 
complaint, instead incorporating racial harassment incidents 
into their sexual harassment claim.  Lawyers may advise them to 
follow this litigation approach because, like everyone else, 
lawyers are more familiar with and more readily identify with 
the sexual harassment model.  Furthermore, lawyers may see 
harassment that includes both sexual and racial harassment more 
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as a variant of sexual harassment than as separate, distinct 
racial and sexual harassment claims.  Finally, framing a lawsuit 
as a sexual harassment rather than a racial harassment claim may 
have strategic advantages.30 
Among the cases in which the plaintiffs’ race and ethnicity 
are known, there are striking differences in the plaintiffs’ 
racial profiles.31 Minority plaintiffs, particularly Black 
plaintiffs, outnumber White plaintiffs in both types of cases.  
Moreover, the gap between Black and White plaintiffs in racial 
harassment cases is greater than in sexual harassment cases.  
The very high percentage of Black plaintiffs indicates that 
Blacks disproportionately bring racial harassment lawsuits, 
suggesting that they perceive they are being racially harassed 
and act on that perception much more frequently than other 
racial groups.32 
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Given the racial composition in the national labor force, 
which is shown in Table 2, the racial representation in these 
cases raises puzzling issues.  For example, while one might 
expect that Blacks would be overrepresented to some extent in 
racial harassment cases (81.6%), it is unclear why their 
percentage in sexual harassment cases (51.9%) is so much higher 
than their percentage in the labor force (11.9%).  Similarly, 
while one might expect that Whites would be underrepresented to 
some extent in racial harassment cases (8.6%), it is unclear why 
their percentage in sexual harassment cases (27.4%) is so much 
lower than their percentage in the labor force (70.0%).  In 
contrast, both Hispanic American and Asian American 
representation among plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases more 
closely approximates their representation in the labor force.  
Could it be that Black women are particularly targeted for 
sexual harassment?33 
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Plaintiffs in these two types of cases also describe their 
harassment differently.  While plaintiffs accuse both racial and 
sexual harassers of using verbal comments, physical objects, 
physical conduct, and employment decisions—the degree and 
content of these harassing behaviors differ.  Offensive oral 
comments, such as derogatory and belittling language, are 
commonly reported by plaintiffs in both racial and sexual 
harassment cases, but the content of these comments reflects 
different prejudicial stereotypes.34 In the relatively small 
percentage of cases in which plaintiffs report the use of 
physical materials and objects, such as letters, posters, 
graffiti, and clothing—the particular objects used also differs, 
depending on the form of harassment.35 
Finally, the differing degrees to which plaintiffs in the 
two types of harassment identify management and other work-
related decisions as a form of harassment are striking.  
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Plaintiffs in racial harassment cases are much more likely to 
cite work-related decisions as an example of harassment (with 
65.8% citing less favorable treatment in work assignments and 
conditions)36 than plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases (with 
27.0% citing less favorable treatment in work assignments and 
conditions).37 This data suggests that racial harassment 
plaintiffs are more sensitive than sexual harassment plaintiffs 
to the possibility that supervisors and coworkers use employment 
decisions and management discretion as forms of harassment and 
discrimination.  In the alternative, it could be that these 
management decisions and discretion are used more as a form of 
racial harassment than as a form of sexual harassment. 
In summary, the plaintiffs’ gender and racial profiles in 
racial harassment cases are notably different than the 
plaintiffs’ profiles in sexual harassment cases.  Plaintiffs in 
the two types of litigation also describe their harassment in 
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distinguishable ways.38 Furthermore, to the extent that 
plaintiffs in these cases are a proxy for racially and sexually 
harassed employees in general,39 these studies support the 
distinctiveness of these groups. 
2. Disparate Judicial Outcomes 
While courts repeatedly state that the same legal 
principles and purposes apply to both sexual harassment and 
racial harassment cases, courts in fact treat these claims 
disparately.  This Article’s comparative analysis of the 
outcomes of sexual harassment and racial harassment proceedings 
reveals that plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases fare much 
better than plaintiffs in racial harassment cases.  This finding 
is surprising given the societal belief that racial 
discrimination and harassment is at least as offensive as sexual 
discrimination and harassment.  
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Summarizing the legal proceedings helps provide the 
litigation context.  First, while plaintiffs in harassment cases 
technically have a right to a jury trial,40 in practice, they 
rarely reach this stage in litigation.  Instead, their 
complaints are typically resolved at pretrial judicial 
proceedings.41 The most common proceeding at the district court 
level for both types of cases is a pretrial motion dealing with 
the substance of the claim.42 As demonstrated in Table 3, the 
types of proceedings parallel one another, although the outcomes 
of the proceedings differ.43 In sexual harassment proceedings, 
plaintiffs are successful 48.2% of the time (in 321 cases).44 In
contrast, plaintiffs in racial harassment proceedings are 
successful only 21.5% of the time (in 57 cases).45 Judges in 
racial harassment cases are much more likely than judges in 
sexual harassment cases to grant defendants’ pretrial motions 
and consequently keep plaintiffs from moving past that gate 
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toward a trial.  Overall, plaintiffs in sexual harassment 
proceedings are more than twice as likely to be successful as 
plaintiffs in racial harassment cases, which indicates that 
judges are much less likely to be persuaded by racial harassment 
plaintiffs than sexual harassment plaintiffs.  Thus, while some 
legal scholars suggest that judges are more sympathetic to 
plaintiffs in racial harassment cases,46 the evidence from these 
studies is contrary to that proposition. 
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Table 3.  Plaintiffs’ Success Rates in Harassment Cases47 
Plaintiffs’ Success 
Rates in Racial 
Harassment Cases 
(N of 
Successful 
Cases) 
Plaintiffs’ Success 
Rates in Sexual 
Harassment Cases 
(N of 
Successful 
Cases) 
Of All Cases 21.5 (57)   48.2 (321) 
By Plaintiffs’ Gender:
Women 
Men 
 
20.8 
22.8 
 
(21) 
(33) 
 
48.1 
38.2 
 
(296) 
(13) 
By Plaintiffs’ Race:
African American 
Hispanic American 
Asian American 
Native American 
White American 
 
19.3 
54.5 
18.1 
 0.0
35.0 
 
(37) 
(6) 
(2) 
(0) 
(7) 
 
45.5 
55.6 
66.7 
0.0 
27.6 
 
(25) 
(10) 
(2) 
(0) 
(8) 
Table 3 compares in more detail how the outcomes in racial 
harassment and sexual harassment cases differ.  For instance, 
one can contrast how men and women plaintiffs fare across and 
within each type of case.  While women plaintiffs in sexual 
harassment cases have only a 48.1% chance of winning their 
cases,48 they are still more than twice as likely to win than 
women plaintiffs in racial harassment cases (20.8% are 
successful).  Male plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases also 
are much more likely to win (38.2% are successful) than their 
counterparts in racial harassment cases (22.8% are successful).49 
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Among racial harassment cases, there are not significant 
gender differences.  That is, both men and women racial 
harassment plaintiffs lose approximately the same percentage of 
cases (about 80%).50 In contrast, there is approximately a 10% 
difference in the success rates of men and women sexual 
harassment plaintiffs, with women being more likely to win.  
Considering the race and ethnicity of the plaintiff reveals 
some intriguing contrasts.51 In particular, African American 
sexual harassment plaintiffs are more than twice as likely 
(45.5%) as their racial harassment counterparts (19.3%) to be 
successful.  Moreover, Black plaintiffs are more successful than 
White plaintiffs in sexual harassment suits (45.5% versus 
27.6%), but less successful than White plaintiffs in racial 
harassment suits (19.3% versus 35%).  Courts do not appear to 
find Blacks’ claims of racial harassment particularly credible.  
White and Hispanic American plaintiffs have much more similar 
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success rates across both types of cases, with Hispanic 
plaintiffs having an approximately 55% success rate and Whites 
between a 27.6% to 35% success rate in the two types of cases. 
Both studies also keep track of the composition of the 
alleged harassers, tracking whether the harassers consist of 
only supervisors, only coworkers, or both supervisors and 
coworkers.  In almost half of the racial harassment cases52 and 
over half of the sexual harassment cases,53 plaintiffs accused 
only supervisors.  However, the studies also indicate that 
harassment by both supervisors and coworkers is not rare, with 
this claim being made in just under 20% of sexual harassment 
cases and over 30% of racial harassment cases.54 This data hints 
that harassment may be more of a group and socially-accepted 
activity than most would like to think. 
The effect of the composition of the alleged harassers on 
outcome is also revealing.  Sexual harassment plaintiffs have 
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better luck when their alleged harassers are only supervisors 
(48% success rate) rather than only coworkers (33.3% success 
rate).55 In contrast, the courts in racial harassment cases 
appear to be indifferent to this distinction.56 However, judges 
in racial harassment cases appear particularly influenced when 
both supervisors and coworkers allegedly participate in the 
harassment.57 Perhaps the suggestion that everyone is “ganging 
up” on a victim significantly bolsters the case for racial 
harassment plaintiffs, almost doubling the odds that judges will 
find in their favor.58 
Considering more specific information about the harassing 
behavior in the two types of cases is interesting but less 
conclusive.  For example, in racial harassment cases, plaintiffs 
have a higher success rate when they claim blatant race-linked 
verbal and physical harassment than when they claim more 
contextual and subtle harassment.59 It is not clear if judges in 
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the sexual harassment cases are similarly more persuaded by 
blatant sex-linked harassment, but there is evidence to suggest 
they are.60 
What explains the dramatic disparity in overall judicial 
outcomes (21.5% plaintiffs’ success rate in racial harassment 
cases versus 48.2% plaintiffs’ success rate in sexual harassment 
cases)? There are a number of possibilities.  One might 
speculate that the studies do not include representative cases.  
Perhaps the sexual harassment study consists of stronger cases 
with particularly favorable plaintiffs’ facts than sexual 
harassment cases in general; or in the alternative, that the 
racial harassment study consists of weaker cases with 
particularly unfavorable plaintiffs’ facts than racial 
harassment cases in general.  Given the research methods used in 
both studies,61 however, there is no reason to think that the 
cases are not representative of each type of case. 
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It could also be that sexual harassment plaintiffs in 
general have stronger cases that lead to more favorable 
outcomes.  For instance, because of the attention given to 
sexual harassment laws, it may be that lawyers are better able 
to gauge and only proceed with cases that have more reasonable 
chances of success.  In contrast, given the lack of attention 
and information on racial harassment laws, it may be that 
lawyers are not as skillful at selecting stronger cases, and 
therefore proceed with a broader range of cases. 
In addition, while the two types of cases presumptively 
have the same legal elements, in practice, some of the elements 
are more salient.  Courts and lawyers apparently find some 
elements more applicable to one type of harassment than another.  
At the same time, this difference in salience may make sexual 
harassment plaintiffs more successful.  For example, except for 
cases with allegations of same-sex harassment, courts do not 
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seem to question plaintiffs’ claims that the harassment was 
“because of” their sex.  In contrast, courts appear more 
skeptical that harassment was “because of” the plaintiff’s race, 
finding plausible a multitude of alternative justifications for 
negative treatment of minority employees.62 Sexual harassment 
plaintiffs also have an additional basis for imposing liability, 
quid pro quo harassment, while lawyers do not currently consider 
this a viable claim for racial harassment plaintiffs.63 On the 
other hand, there are also situations in which the differences 
in the elements’ salience would not logically result in more 
successful sexual harassment plaintiffs.  For example, sexual 
harassment plaintiffs have a more onerous legal challenge given 
that courts require that they show the harassment is 
“unwelcome,” while courts do not appear to impose this 
requirement on racial harassment plaintiffs. 
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It could also be that judges treat these cases differently 
because, for a range of reasons not yet fully understood, they 
find racial harassment plaintiffs’ claims of harassment less 
credible.  Perhaps judges, who are mostly male, find sexual 
harassment more plausible because they can imagine their wives 
and daughters as hypothetical plaintiffs.  In contrast, given 
that judges are mostly White, it might be more difficult for 
them to identify with minority plaintiffs in racial harassment 
lawsuits and to share their perception of discriminatory 
harassment.  The reality is that individuals of different races 
perceive discrimination and harassment differently,64 and there 
is no reason to think that judges would be any different.      
 
B. Distinctive Theories 
There is very little research that specifically compares 
racial harassment and sexual harassment, but the little that 
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exists offers striking contrasts between the two.  Aravinda 
Nadimpalli Reeves’ study of gender and race dynamics in Chicago 
law firms exemplifies.65 While her sociological research 
considers the range of gender and race dynamics broadly, it 
prominently includes an analysis of racial harassment and sexual 
harassment.  Furthermore, in explaining the dynamics of racial 
harassment and sexual harassment at the firms, she finds a 
different theoretical framework appropriate for understanding 
each form of harassment.  Her reference to Rosabeth Moss 
Kanter’s theory of tokenism to explain racial harassment and 
Barbara Gutek’s sex-role spillover theory to explain sexual 
harassment illustrates the need for distinctive theories to 
understand the distinctive dynamics of the two forms of 
harassment.66 Her work also demonstrates that harassment, both 
racial harassment and sexual harassment, may be understood best 
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in the specific workplace context (i.e., law firms) in which 
they occur. 
 
1. Dynamics of Racial Harassment 
Reeves reports that both White and African American 
attorneys feel the culture in law firms has changed so that 
blatant racism is less likely.  However, both groups also 
acknowledge that occasional incidents of blatant racism still 
occur and numerous inferences of inferiority and other subtle 
racial harassment exist.67 White attorneys tellingly assess the 
inappropriateness of racist incidents based on whether a racial 
minority hears the remark or whether the comment occurs in the 
workplace, rather than on the racialized content of the remark 
itself.68 Thus, White attorneys appear most focused on the 
firm’s legal and financial liability risks, as well as their 
own.69 The following are excerpts from Reeves’ study; the race 
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and gender of the speaker is noted at the beginning of each 
quote.  
 
[White male:]  [T]here was a group of lawyers sitting 
around in one . . . lawyer’s office and they were 
talking about welfare reform and one of the lawyers 
said something about “those lazy bums on welfare—why 
can’t they get off their asses and get jobs?”  And 
another lawyer said something to the effect that 
everyone on welfare was Black and maybe there was a 
laziness in Black culture.  When he said that, 
everyone looked around like, whoa, glad no one who 
would be offended heard that.  People are very careful 
about liability.70 
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[White female:]  I was sitting in a client meeting 
. . . one of our clients actually started to tell an 
off color joke [about racial minorities] . . . and the 
opposing client said, “this is an inappropriate place 
to tell that joke.”  And it made me feel better 
because I would have felt very uncomfortable telling 
my client that I think you’re a pig.  I think most 
lawyers know well enough.  I mean, their personal 
feelings aside, hopefully they know well enough that 
in the law firm you don’t say things that are 
inappropriate.71 
Reeves finds Rosabeth Moss Kanter’s theory of tokenism 
particularly appropriate for understanding the causes of racial 
harassment and its effects on African American attorneys.72 
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Kanter’s theory focuses on work groups in which there is a 
numerically dominant group and a smaller token group.73 She
posits that the dominant group often treats the tokens as 
symbolic representatives of its category rather than as 
individuals, and perceives them through the particular frames of 
visibility, contrast, and assimilation.74 As applied to the law 
firm context in Reeves’ study, Kanter’s theory would consider 
White attorneys the dominants, given their high proportional 
representation at the firms, and African Americans and other 
racial groups as the tokens, given their minority 
representation.  
Consistent with Kanter’s theory, Reeves finds that because 
African Americans, as tokens, are so visible, they experience 
performance pressures that those in the dominant group are less 
likely to experience.75 White attorneys, as dominants, also 
perceive African Americans in contrast to their own identities, 
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prompting White attorneys to be self-conscious of and exaggerate 
attributes of their culture to strengthen the boundaries between 
them and the tokens.  The following examples demonstrate 
Reeves’findings. 
 
[White male:]  I did serve on the hiring committee at 
the larger firm.  I noticed that a lot more questions 
and doubts were expressed about minority candidates.  
A lot of comments about affirmative action and 
“needing to get our numbers up.”  [Comments on] that 
we needed to increase the number of minorities at the 
firm.  Would minorities have a difficult time fitting 
in?  Do we have any clients that would have a problem 
working with African American lawyers?  Whose 
responsibility would it be to watch them?  Yes, watch 
them . . . make sure that they don’t screw up.  These 
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were the kinds of comments made.  Both firms had a 
very difficult time holding onto minority attorneys 
they did hire.  So they were always looking for the 
“right fit.” 76 
[White male:]  One firm I was at had no minorities on 
the hiring committee.  And, whenever we would hire 
another minority associate, I think we had around four 
or five, there were partners that called them “A2s” 
[pronounced A squared] for affirmative action cases 
. . . The Black candidates weren’t necessarily any 
less qualified than any other candidates we hired 
. . . we were under the gun from a large client to get 
our minority stats up, and we weren’t a popular firm 
for minority candidates to apply to . . . so, we hired 
the ones we got apps [applications] from . . . some 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art54
-41-
were good candidates . . . but we called them all 
“A2s.”  I had one Black associate in my group, and once 
in a while a partner would ask me, “how’s the A2
doing?” 77 
White attorneys’ possibly benign or even complimentary 
intent in distinguishing African American attorneys did not 
prevent the minority attorneys from feeling insulted: 
 
[White female:]  I had a very good friend [an African 
American male] . . . when we were summer associates 
together, we went to a founders’ luncheon . . . well, 
you go around the table and you answer questions that 
the partner[s] have.  And [the African American male 
lawyer] answered a question, and one of the partners 
said “that’s so articulate.”  So, of course we get 
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back to the office, and he’s just exploding in his 
office . . . he’s Stanford educated and went to 
Northwestern law school . . . why would he not be 
articulate?  He was also on the debate team, he’s gone 
to nationals . . . . Yeah, to get “so articulate” with 
nothing about substance . . . . “Oh look, he can 
speak.”  So he did feel that always he was 
underestimated.78 
[African American male:]  Sometimes the White partners 
will say things that they think are compliments.  Like 
one partner came to me one day and said “go find me 
some more lawyers like you.”  And in the context of 
the conversation, “like you” meant African American.  
Why couldn’t he just say “go find me some good 
lawyers” . . . the perception of you as the exception 
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to the rule is what is hardest to deal with 
sometimes.79 
[African American male:]  No blatant remarks at a law 
firm.  People are too careful.  They use codes 
instead.  Like they will say that they like the 
minorities as people, but their work product is not 
quite up to par.  Or they will say that about the 
Black judges . . . that they’re nice people but 
they’re incompetent.  I don’t hear them make the same 
comments about White judges or attorneys.  Also, I 
have White attorneys say that the Black judges have 
personal biases that affect their rulings, the 
outcomes.  That has always amazed me because that is 
never said about White judges . . . it’s like the 
White judges’ rulings are never affected by their 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
-44-
biases . . . . The same for minority attorneys—if 
you’re on the plaintiff side of a race-discrimination 
suit, it’s “oh well, he’s only pushing the suit 
because he’s Black.”  And if you’re on the defense 
side, it’s “oh, what an obvious move by the firm or 
the defendant to put a Black man out there for this 
suit.”  You never have the opportunity to get past the 
codes to be judged on the merits.80 
Kanter’s theory also asserts that “the characteristics of 
tokens as individuals are often distorted to fit preexisting 
generalizations about their category as a group”—a process 
Kanter calls assimilation.81 Reeves’ work illustrates that these 
stereotypes may differ depending on the occupation.  In the 
context of lawyering, African American attorneys believe there 
are preexisting generalizations about them as incompetent, 
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having substandard writing skills, and having been hired because 
of preferential affirmative action treatment.82 
These stereotypes lead to a cycle of subtle disparate 
treatment. While firms have positive expectations of entering 
White attorneys’ performance, African American attorneys report 
that the firms’ stereotypes of their incompetence and 
substandard writing skills are quite real and active.83 
Moreover, they report that these stereotypes combined with their 
token status lead to their work being more scrutinized.84 Given 
these circumstances, African American attorneys felt they were 
more scrutinized and had to work considerably harder to achieve 
a comparable level of credibility as White attorneys.85 At the 
same time, the stereotypes of their incompetence resulted in 
lower quality assignments that ultimately lead to conclusions of 
their unsuitability for partnership.86 
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Reeves concluded that this cycle was a substantially 
different one than the one a White attorney would undertake 
in his or her progression towards a partnership in a law 
firm.87 In contrast, many White attorneys did not feel that 
there were different expectations or standards for Whites 
and African Americans.88 
Finally, Reeves’ data suggests that African American 
attorneys are subject to racial harassment in their 
organizations more frequently than they would like to admit.  
Respondents reported that their experiences are “a rare incident 
on the racial radar screen,” but their interviews in the 
aggregate reveal a prevalence of racialized comments.89 As other 
social scientists have found, there appears to be a tendency for 
minorities to downplay racial incidents in their workplace.90 
2. Dynamics of Sexual Harassment 
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Both men and women attorneys report a change in 
organizational climate in the wake of Supreme Court cases 
drawing attention to the possibility of organizational 
liability.  While more blatant and direct sexual harassment, 
such as quid pro quo harassment, has decreased substantially, it 
has not disappeared.  Women attorneys still report unwanted 
touching and incidents of being propositioned.  At the same 
time, more subtle and indirect forms of harassment are quite 
prevalent. 
While Reeves uses Kanter’s token theory to explain racial 
harassment, she uses alternative theories to explain sexual 
harassment in the law firms.  In particular, she finds Barbara 
Gutek’s sex-role spillover theory effective for studying subtle 
and indirect forms of sexual harassment.91 Gutek’s theory 
asserts that socially-constructed, gender-based expectations of 
women spill over into the workplace, prompting men to view women 
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as sexual objects rather than as work colleagues.92 The gender-
ratio also makes a difference:  women in male-dominated jobs are 
more likely and women in gender-integrated jobs are less likely 
to experience sex-role spillover.93 
In particular, many male attorneys report sexualized 
conversations outside the presence of women attorneys; in 
effect, harassment has gone “underground.”  These attorneys’ 
comments evidence the spill-over theory that women are viewed as 
sexual objects: 
 
[White male:]  I’ve probably even said things that if 
my wife heard them, she would feel it’s inappropriate.  
Nothing disrespectful, but I have commented on a 
woman’s physical appearance, and I have joined in 
conversations with other men commenting on women’s 
appearance . . . about female attorneys and female 
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staff.  But we would never make comments to them 
directly.  That was actually one of the things that we 
would discuss, how you can’t compliment women anymore 
because of the fear of complimenting a woman who will 
be offended.94 
[White male:]  Men discuss the female associates.  The 
conversations are always couched in “we shouldn’t be 
talking about this, but” or “this is really 
inappropriate, but.”  Women’s sexuality, their 
attractiveness, their bodies, whether or not we would 
want to have sex with them, how they would be in bed, 
etc.  I’d really like to think it’s just harmless 
innocuous macho talk, but some men make these kinds of 
comments so frequently.  And the more someone talks 
about this, the more you do wonder if he can see women 
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as colleagues, as equals.  You start wondering if some 
men can actually talk to women instead of just talking 
about them because they will tell you about 
conversations that they have had with women where they 
were thinking about her breasts the whole time.95 
Also consistent with Gutek’s theory are attorneys’ reports 
of firm-sanctioned social events in which the sexuality of women 
is the basis of the entertainment.96 Reeves notes the bind that 
women attorneys experience.97 On one hand, they can go to these 
events and be uncomfortable, angry, or humiliated.98 On the
other hand, they can refuse to go to these events and be 
excluded from networking and sponsorship opportunities that 
these events provide and be criticized as “not one of the 
gang.”99 
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[White female:]  In some ways, it’s almost too many to 
name, but I’ll tell you two egregious incidents.  The 
first one was when a male partner turned 50 . . . the 
firm wanted to throw him a birthday party, and per his 
request, he wanted the party to be at a strip bar.  
Everyone was invited . . . the men and the women.  
When some of the male associates talked about the 
party, they referred to the bar as a “titty bar” and 
it was fine because it was a firm sanctioned event.  
It was absolutely absurd.  Most of the women did not 
go.  I definitely did not go.  So how do we evaluate 
it?  Is it that women aren’t team players?  That 
incident made me very angry, but who are you going to 
complain to . . . the response is going to be that 
that was where he wanted it.  Another partner’s 
birthday party . . . some of the male associates sent 
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a belly dancer to the bar for the party . . . their 
reasoning was that they checked with his wife first, 
and she was fine with it, so no one else should have a 
problem with it.  The women associates were clearly 
very uncomfortable.  Again, if you complained, you 
just would not be invited again . . . I mean, it was 
really weird being around a group of guys watching 
this woman dance and they were cheering her on.  The 
price you pay [for complaining] is too high.100 
Reeves also describes pornographic emails as a source 
of blatant sexual harassment.101 Although firms often have 
policies on the appropriate uses of emails, these policies 
have not stopped these incidents.102 
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[White Female:]  [T]here was a period of time when the 
emails would come around at least once or twice a day.  
I would erase them immediately, but there would be a 
second or two where I would have to see it because 
those emails looked like any other office email until 
you opened it, and some of them were very graphic, 
sexually I mean.  I got so sick of it that I went to 
one of the associates who was sending them and told 
him to take me off the list.  He told me to loosen up 
and not take it so seriously.103 
Thus, while Reeves uses Kanter’s token theory to help 
explain racial harassment, she finds Gutek’s spillover theory 
more appropriate for understanding sexual harassment.  As the 
above interview excerpts illustrate, Reeves finds ample support 
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for Gutek’s theory that men’s casting of women as sexual objects 
spills over into the workplace, leading to sexual harassment.  
 
III 
 Implications 
 Sexual harassment jurisprudence serves as the model for all 
kinds of harassment, including racial harassment.  The 
cornerstones of harassment law as delineated by the Supreme 
Court are built around sexual harassment fact patterns.  Courts 
and commentators routinely assume that these same legal 
principles and their interpretations are appropriately applied 
to racial harassment claims. 
Analogizing racial harassment to sexual harassment in the 
absence of further study, however, is problematic.  One 
intuitively suspects that racial harassment and sexual 
harassment have fundamental differences regarding, for instance, 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art54
-55-
their causes, targets, and consequences.  Rather than relying 
only on intuition, this Article presents empirical evidence of 
some of those differences.   
In particular, this Article substantiates that individuals 
who bring racial harassment lawsuits are distinct in ethnicity 
and gender, and describe their harassment differently than those 
who bring sexual harassment litigation.  Moreover, it finds that 
judges reach very different conclusions in racial harassment 
lawsuits than sexual harassment lawsuits.  While sexual 
harassment plaintiffs only win approximately half their cases, 
racial harassment plaintiffs fare even worse.  In addition, 
drawing on sociological research on gender and race dynamics in 
law firms, different theories are effective in explaining the 
variations of harassment, suggesting that the causes and 
manifestations of each type of harassment are distinct. 
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While research comparing racial harassment with sexual 
harassment is still in its early stages, tentative observations 
indicate significant dissimilarities between the two.  While 
much attention has appropriately been focused on sexual 
harassment, it is now time to develop a jurisprudential model 
specifically for racial harassment that is cognizant of its 
distinct attributes and complexity.  As this model evolves, 
there are many issues to address.   To what extent should the 
elements of a racial harassment claim be reinterpreted?   To 
what extent are the elements of a sexual harassment claim ever 
appropriate to a racial harassment claim?  As the legal 
community begins to puzzle through these major jurisprudential 
issues, two relevant issues discussed in the concluding remarks 
of this Article should be considered.  Neither issue is easily 
resolved, but it is critical that the legal community addresses 
both. 
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A. Varied Racial Perspectives on What Constitutes Harassment 
Given that the purpose of Title VII is to remove hostile, 
debilitating work environments, it is essential to understand 
when targeted racial groups consider their workplace hostile and 
debilitating.  This task, however, is complicated because Whites 
and minority Americans have different perceptions of what 
constitutes racial discrimination and harassment.  At the same 
time, Whites’ perspectives are important because Whites are 
typically supervisors and coworkers of minority employees and 
are also the most likely defendants in racial harassment 
cases.104 
Citing others’ research of employees at large companies, 
Katherine Naff notes that “black and white managers may hold 
cognitively different theories to explain what happens in the 
organizational world in which they live.”105 She continues:  
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
-58-
“That Euro-Americans and people of color often live in very 
different perceptual worlds has been continually demonstrated by 
polling data.”106 Based on her own research, Naff reaches the 
same conclusion about employees of the federal government.107 
She asked thousands of federal employees for their opinions on 
how minorities and nonminorities are treated in their 
organizations.108 Table 4 shows that the most dramatic 
differences are consistently between African Americans and 
Whites.  In comparison to Whites, African Americans generally 
describe a work environment with more discrimination of 
minorities.  For example, 61.4% of African Americans, but only 
23.4% of Whites, strongly agree or agree that “[m]inority women 
face extra obstacles to advancement.” 
Table 4.  Federal Employees’ Perceptions of How Minorities
Are Treated in Their Organizations (Percent)109 
African 
American 
Asian  
Pacific 
American 
Latino/a Native 
American 
White 
American 
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In my organization, 
nonminorities receive 
preferential treatment 
compared to minorities. 
 Strongly agree/agree 58.0 
 
34.6 
 
40.0 
 
26.0 
 
8.2 
Minority women face extra 
obstacles to advancement. 
Strongly agree/agree 
 
61.4 
 
34.4 
 
48.7 
 
37.2 
 
23.4 
The viewpoint of a minority 
is often not heard at a 
meeting until it is repeated 
by a nonminority. 
Strongly agree/agree 
 
50.9 
 
25.7 
 
38.2 
 
25.3 
 
8.3 
Once a minority assumes a 
top management position, 
that position often loses 
much of its power and 
prestige. 
Strongly agree/agree 
 
44.1 
 
18.2 
 
24.7 
 
25.9 
 
7.5 
My organization is 
reluctant to promote 
minorities to supervisory or 
management positions. 
Strongly agree/agree 
 
46.2 
 
26.5 
 
27.5 
 
20.8 
 
7.7 
Naff’s research confirms another complicating but important 
factor in understanding when targeted racial groups consider 
their workplace environment hostile and debilitating.  Each 
racial and ethnic group has its own unique perceptions.  
Assuming a single minority perspective risks gross 
overgeneralizations.  To illustrate from Table 4, a different 
percentage of each racial group agrees with the statement:  “In 
my organization, nonminorities receive preferential treatment 
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compared to minorities.”  For example, 40% of Hispanic 
Americans, but only 26% of Native Americans, strongly agree or 
agree with that statement.   
Each racial and ethnic group is harassed in particular ways 
in part because society imposes myriad stereotypes.110 Each 
racial group also has had different experiences of 
discrimination in American history.111 Considering these 
stereotypes and histories, each racial group is likely to find 
distinct comments and conduct insulting, intimidating, and 
demeaning.  Hispanic Americans, for instance, are more 
vulnerable to harassment on the basis of their suspected 
immigration status and English language abilities; African 
Americans about their work habits and general intelligence; 
Asian Americans about their cultural traditions and social 
skills; and Native Americans about their reliability and 
sobriety.112 
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Racial stereotyping and discriminatory treatment also 
affect individuals of each group differently.113 Furthermore, all 
individuals of a given racial group do not necessarily perceive 
their workplace in the same way.  Just as there is no single 
minority perspective, there is not a single perspective of 
members of any racial group.  Lawrence Bobo and Susan Suh, for 
instance, consider how a host of factors (including nativity—
United States or foreign, gender, age, education, occupation, 
and income) affect individuals of each racial group’s reporting 
of personal experience of racial discrimination in the 
workplace.114 They find, for instance, that African Americans 
born overseas are much less likely to report racial 
discrimination than African Americans born in the United States; 
that less-educated Asian Americans are much less likely to 
report discrimination than the most highly-educated Asian 
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Americans; and that younger Latinos/as are less likely to report 
discrimination than older Latinos/as.115 
Finally, despite the common societal belief that racial 
harassment is essentially a White on Black phenomenon, the 
reality is more multicultural.  Bobo and Suh’s research 
illustrates that harassers and their targets are of all racial 
backgrounds and combinations.  In fact, African Americans are 
most likely to report personal experiences of discrimination 
when their coworkers are Asian Americans, and Asian Americans 
are most likely to report discrimination when their coworkers 
are African Americans.116 Kelley’s and my research on racial 
harassment cases also confirms that, while judicial opinions 
most typically report alleged White harassers and Black targets, 
there are other pairings.  Harassers and targets may be of the 
same race or of different minority groups; alternatively, 
minorities might harass White targets.117 
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B. Relationship Between Racial Harassment and Sexual 
Harassment 
While emerging empirical evidence shows that racial 
harassment and sexual harassment are not the same thing, that 
does not mean that no relationship between the two forms of 
harassment exists.  By explicitly acknowledging that they are 
distinct, however, one can begin to explore more seriously how 
they are related.  Understanding their relationship will help 
one to better understand each form of harassment.  It will also 
prompt one to explore the relationship between sexual 
harassment, racial harassment, and other forms of harassment 
such as religious, age, disability, or national origin 
harassment.118 
Racial harassment and sexual harassment, for instance, may 
share some commonalities despite their distinct characteristics.  
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Their illegalities are based in part on the same legislative 
foundation.119 Some harassers may target “outsiders” without 
particular regard to whether that outsider status is based on 
race or gender.   
Some harassing incidents may be exclusively sexual 
harassment or exclusively racial harassment.  Other incidents 
may be a combination.  Some researchers, for instance, study the 
sexual harassment of minority women, suggesting that there are 
elements of both forms of harassment.120 They point to 
harassers’ use of such degrading phrases as “Black bitch” to 
demonstrate this possible intersection.121 The concerns raised 
in this Article about presumptively using sexual harassment as 
the model encourage the rethinking of whether the analysis of 
such cases should be reframed.  Rather than assuming that the 
harassers and victims perceive their harassment as primarily 
sexual—and wondering how it might differ for minority women, 
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perhaps the legal community should instead consider whether the 
harassers and victims perceive their harassment as primarily 
racial—and wonder how it might differ because of the gender of 
the target.  This shift to first considering a race-based model, 
rather than a gender-based model, is not merely procedural.  It 
may well be that considering racial harassment as gendered
rather than sexual harassment as raced will provide more 
accurate insight into harassers’ motivations and into why 
targets feel humiliated and degraded.  Harassment of minority 
targets might be more complex and nuanced than originally 
thought. 
In Reeves’ research of lawyers, for instance, African 
American women report less sexual harassment than White women.122 
They conjecture that White men racialize them more than 
sexualize them:   
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[African American female:]  I think there’s a 
difference between how White women and Black women are 
treated. . . . [T]he majority of men at a firm are 
White men, and they have no idea how to deal with you, 
but they definitely don’t deal with you as a sexual 
person. . . . They can’t bond with me over sports like 
they can with Black men . . . so I’m in this weird 
category where they awkwardly negotiate their 
interactions with me instead of dealing with me like a 
whole human being.123 
In other research, however, African American and other minority 
women feel particularly targeted for harassment, including 
sexual harassment, and attribute their targeting to their 
color.124 These research examples suggest that harassers’ 
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motivations and targets’ harms are interwoven with race (and 
gender) in ways that are not currently understood. 
______________ 
 As employees, employers, judges, and juries consider the 
viability of a racial harassment complaint, this Article argues 
that they should not feel bound to the sexual harassment model.  
They should instead affirmatively question the appropriateness 
of analogizing one form of harassment to another.  In order to 
fulfill the goals of Title VII, they should carefully consider 
the nuances of racial harassment, rather than rotely assuming 
that harassing behavior in the workplace is monolithic.   
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 Professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law.  This 
Article is the second in a series of three articles on workplace 
racial harassment law. The first article, Pat K. Chew & Robert 
E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law, 27 Berkeley J. Emp. 
& Lab. L. 49 (2006), provides an empirical baseline on racial 
harassment case law.  This second Article compares racial 
harassment and sexual harassment laws.  The third article will 
focus on the relationship between judge characteristics and 
outcomes in racial harassment cases.  I thank Robert Kelley for 
reviewing this Article and his ongoing consultation and support 
of this research agenda.  I am grateful to my excellent research 
assistants Kathleen Bulger, Claire Lobes, and Jennedy Santolla, 
and to my Managing Editor, Caryn Ackerman, and her team of 
editors at Oregon Law Review. I also appreciated the 
opportunity to discuss this research at a program sponsored by 
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the Association of American Law Schools Women in Legal Education 
Section in January 2006.     
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6 See, e.g., Dianne Rucinski, A Review: Rush to Judgment? Fast
Reaction Polls in the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas Controversy, 57
Pub. Opinion Q. 575 (1993) (surveying public opinions on Anita 
Hill’s accusations of sexual harassment against her former 
employer Clarence Thomas).  For example, one case that caught 
the public’s attention was Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, in which 
an appellate court in California held a large law firm liable 
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for $50,000 in compensatory damages and $3.5 million in punitive 
damages for sexual harassment by a partner who was a serial 
harasser of law firm employees. 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 510 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1998).  
7 See Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial
Harassment Law, 27 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 49 (2006) 
(summarizing the limited research on racial harassment).  
8 Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 57 (noting the pervasive citing 
of the Harris case in racial harassment cases); L. Camille 
Hébert, Analogizing Race and Sex in Workplace Harassment Claims,
58 Ohio St. L.J. 819, 821-36 (discussing judicial analogizing of 
racial harassment and sexual harassment); Debra Domenick, 
Comment, Title VII: How Recent Developments in the Law of
Sexual Harassment Apply With Equal Force to Claims of Racial
Harassment, 103 Dick. L. Rev. 765 (1999).  My review of numerous 
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racial harassment cases, in Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, also 
reveals this pattern.  
9 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66-67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 
682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)).  
10 Id. at 67. 
11 Harris, 510 U.S. at 24 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).   
12 See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Legal Reason:  The Use of Analogy in 
Legal Argument (2005); Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning:
Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument
by Analogy, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 923, 1016-18 (1996).  
13 See, e.g., Martha Minow, Making All the Difference:  Inclusion, 
Exclusion, and American Law 1, 3-4 (1990) (discussing 
consequences of categorization); Kevin Avruch and Peter W. 
Black, Conflict Resolution in Intercultural Settings: Problems
and Prospects, in The Conflict & Culture Reader 7, 7-14 (Pat K.
Chew ed., 2001) (describing the tendency to explain an “opaque” 
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culture with logic from our own “transparent” culture); Ronald 
Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of
Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
1103, 1145-63 (2004) (explaining the categorization process and 
its effects). 
14 See sources cited supra note 1.  See also Serena Mayeri, Note, 
“A Common Fate of Discrimination”: Race-Gender Analogies in
Legal and Historical Perspective, 110 Yale L.J. 1045 (2001) 
(describing a purposeful analogy between gender and race in 
civil rights over time).  
15 See generally Theresa M. Beiner, Gender Myths v. Working 
Realities:  Using Social Science to Reformulate Sexual 
Harassment Law (2005); Mia L. Cahill, The Social Construction of 
Sexual Harassment Law (2001); Joe R. Feagin, Racist America:  
Roots, Current Realities, and Future Reparations (2000); 
Measuring Racial Discrimination (Rebecca M. Blank, Marilyn 
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Dabady, & Constance F. Citro eds., 2004); Maria P. P. Root, The
Consequences of Racial and Ethnic Origins Harassment in the
Workplace, in Race, Culture, Psychology, & Law 125 (Kimberly 
Holt Barrett & William H. George eds., 2005).  
16 See Hébert, supra note 8, at 860-62 (describing this risk for 
racial harassment plaintiffs); Rhonda M. Reaves, One of These
Things is Not Like the Other: Analogizing Ageism to Racism in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 38 U. Rich. L. Rev. 839 (2004) 
(arguing that analogizing ageism to racism creates similar 
burdens on age discrimination plaintiffs).   
17 See, e.g., Nicole T. Buchanan & Alayne J. Ormerod, Racialized
Sexual Harassment in the Lives of African American Women, in
Violence in the Lives of Black Women:  Battered, Black, and Blue 
107 (Carolyn M. West ed., 2002); Tanya Katerí Hernández, Sexual
Harassment and Racial Disparity: The Mutual Construction of
Gender and Race, 4 J. Gender Race & Just. 183 (2001); Audrey J. 
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Murrell, Sexual Harassment and Women of Color: Issues,
Challenges, and Future Direction, in Sexual Harassment in the 
Workplace:  Perspectives, Frontiers, and Response Strategies 51
(Margaret S. Stockdale ed., 1996).  
18 Hébert, supra note 8, at 860. 
19 See id. at 848-66.  
20 See id. at 878-79. 
21 See Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 87-88.  For instance, when 
the plaintiffs claimed defendants used obvious racist objects, 
such as nooses or Ku Klux Klan-associated attire, the plaintiffs 
were successful in their judicial proceedings only a third of 
the time.  Id. at 87-88 & tbl.14. 
22 See generally Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring
the Importance of Race: The Implication of Making Comparisons
Between Racism and Sexism (Or Other –Isms), 1991 Duke L.J. 397; 
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Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581 (1990).  
23 The extensive research on sex discrimination and race 
discrimination tends to study each form of discrimination 
independently of one another.  See sources cited supra note 14.  
Some researchers, however, consider the relationship between sex 
and race discrimination.  See, e.g., Blankenship, supra note 1; 
William A. Darity, Jr. & Patrick L. Mason, Evidence on
Discrimination in Employment: Codes of Color, Codes of Gender,
J. Econ. Persp., Spring 1998, at 63 (describing evidence of 
discriminatory treatment as a major cause of racial and gender 
employment disparities); Mark Pogrebin, Mary Dodge & Harold 
Chatman, Reflections of African-American Women on their Careers
in Urban Policing: Their Experiences of Racial and Sexual
Discrimination, 28 Int’l J. Soc. L. 311, 314-19 (2000) 
(describing the gender discrimination and the racial 
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discrimination faced by African American women police officers). 
Darity and Mason include separate discussions of research 
studies on race, Darity & Mason, supra, at 70-76, and gender, 
id. at 68-70. 
24 Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual 
Harassment Cases, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 548 (2001). 
25 Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 53-54. The project included 
260 cases randomly selected to be representative of the universe 
of cases. See id. (explaining research methodology).  
26 While the two studies are comparable in a number of ways, 
there are differences as well. The sexual harassment study 
covers only ten years (1986-1996), Juliano & Schwab, supra note 
24, at 550, whereas the racial harassment study essentially 
covers the entire litigation history of racial harassment cases 
up through 2002, Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 53-54.  
Although we assume that the cases in the sexual harassment study 
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are representative of all cases, we cannot be certain that the 
cases between 1976 and 1985 or between 1997 and 2002 have the 
same characteristics as those in the study.  Also, the two 
studies differ in some of the research methodologies utilized.  
Both types of litigation had approximately the same percentage 
of district court and appellate court cases (the percentage of 
racial harassment cases at the district court level is 79.2% and 
at the appellate court level is 20.4%; the percentage of sexual 
harassment cases at the district court level is 75.4% and at the 
appellate court level is 24.6%).  Compare Chew & Kelley, supra
note 7, at 76 tbl.9, with Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, at 
556.  In addition, the sexual harassment study focuses on the 
differences between district court and appellate court cases, 
see Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, at 554, 560-76, while the 
racial harassment study tends to summarize the cases as a whole,  
see Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 53-54.  With some simple 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
-80-
calculations, however, we are able to use the data available 
about the sexual harassment cases to compute aggregate data 
about the cases as a whole.  At other times, the differences in 
methodologies limited the possible comparisons.   
27 The statistics regarding racial harassment draw from Chew & 
Kelley, supra note 7, at 64 tbl.1, and the statistics concerning 
sexual harassment are derived from Juliano and Schwab, supra
note 24, app.A, at 594-97. 
28 See U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United 
States:  2002, at 16 tbl.14, 368 tbl.562 (122d ed. 2002).  For 
further explanation of how these percentages are derived, 
contact the author.  
29 See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 18, 
25-42 (2005) (summarizing social science research on employees’ 
reluctance to acknowledge and report discrimination).  
30 See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing outcomes of cases).    
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31 One consideration in interpreting this data is that the 
availability of plaintiffs’ race differs in the two types of 
cases.  Plaintiffs’ races are identifiable in a high percentage 
of the racial harassment cases (90%), Chew & Kelley, supra note 
7, at 63 n.62, 64 & tbl.1, but were available in only a 
comparatively small percent of the sexual harassment cases 
(15.9%), Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, app.A, at 594.  Thus, 
the percentages in Table 1 are based on 106 cases in the sexual 
harassment study, Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, app.A, at 
594, and 234 cases in the racial harassment study, Chew & 
Kelley, supra note 7, at 63 n.62.  The race of many plaintiffs 
in the sexual harassment cases is unknown.  See Juliano & 
Schwab, supra note 24, app.A, at 594.  To the extent that a 
number of these unknown plaintiffs are White, the actual racial 
composition may differ substantially. 
32 See infra text accompanying notes 105-108.   
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33 For further discussion on this inquiry, see Buchanan & 
Ormerod, supra note 16, Hébert, supra note 8, Hernández, supra
note 17, and Pogrebin et al., supra note 23. 
34 Plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases claim, for instance, 
that harassers make oral comments about their physical 
appearance and sexual comments in over 47% of the cases. Juliano 
& Schwab, supra note 24, app.A, at 596.  These percentages on 
the nature of sexual harassment are based on all 666 sexual 
harassment cases.  See id. Plaintiffs in racial harassment 
cases instead report ethnic and racial slurs associated with 
their race.  Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 72-74 & tbl.8. 
35 For example, objects such as nooses and Ku Klux Klan attire 
are used in 5.8% of racial harassment cases.  Id. In contrast, 
sexual materials are left for the plaintiff in 5.1% of the 
sexual harassment cases.  Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, 
app.A, at 596.  Physical contact of a sexual nature (such as 
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grabbing and pinching) is cited in 43.2% of sexual harassment 
cases; physical contact of a nonsexual nature is cited in 9.0% 
of sexual harassment cases.  Id. In contrast, physical contact 
in racial harassment cases such as shoving and hitting is 
reported in only 15% of the cases.  Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, 
at 74 tbl.8. 
36 Id.
37 Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, app.A, at 596. 
38 I attempted to compare the plaintiffs’ occupations.  The two 
studies categorize occupations in different ways, however, so it 
is not possible to compare the differences among specific 
occupations.  What is clear, however, is that both alleged 
racial harassment and sexual harassment occur across many 
occupational areas.  They are not limited to those in clerical 
or blue-collar positions; individuals in professional and 
management occupations bring a notable percentage of the racial 
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harassment cases (19.3%), Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 66 
tbl.3, and sexual harassment cases (28.1%), Juliano & Schwab, 
supra note 24, app.A, at 594.  Both types of litigation also had 
approximately the same percentage of cases dealing with private 
and public sector employment settings.  Compare Chew & Kelley, 
supra note 7, at 70 tbl.6 (the percentage of racial harassment 
cases in the private sector is 69.6% and in the public sector is 
30.4%), with Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, app.A, at 595 (the 
percentage of sexual harassment cases in the private sector is 
71% and in the public sector is 29%).  Thus, it appears that 
sexual and racial harassment occurs throughout the workforce.  
See Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 66 tbl.3, 70 tbl.6; Juliano 
& Schwab, supra note 24, app.A, at 594-95. 
39 Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 52 n.7 (explaining caveats in 
generalizing from a study of judicial opinions on racial 
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harassment complaints to generalizing about racial harassment in 
the workplace). 
40 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2000).    
41 See Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in
Hostile Environment Cases, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 71 (1999); 
Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 77. 
42 Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 77; Juliano & Schwab, supra
note 24, app.A, at 597.  
43 It is also interesting that both types of cases published in 
the Federal Reporters have a higher plaintiffs’ win rate than 
cases in general.  The plaintiffs’ success rate in sexual 
harassment cases published in the official reporter is 53% 
compared to the average success rate of all sexual harassment 
cases of 48.2%.  Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, app.A, at 594.  
The plaintiffs’ success rate of racial harassment cases 
published in the official reporter is 30.7% compared to the 
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average of 21.5%. See Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 84, 91 
tbl.16. 
44 The plaintiffs’ success rate is 51.2% in district court 
proceedings and 39% in appellate court proceedings.  Juliano & 
Schwab, supra note 24, app.A, at 594. 
45 The plaintiffs’ success rate is 20.8% in district court 
proceedings and 24.5% in appellate court proceedings.  Chew & 
Kelley, supra note 7, at 90 tbl.15.  
46 See, e.g., Robert J. Gregory, You Can Call Me a “Bitch” Just
Don’t Use the “N-Word”: Some Thoughts on Galloway v. General 
Motors Service Parts Operations and Rodgers v. Western Southern 
Life Insurance Co., 46 DePaul L. Rev. 741, 742-43 (1997); Judith 
J. Johnson, License to Harass Women: Requiring Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment to Be “Severe or Pervasive”
Discriminates Among “Terms and Conditions” of Employment, 62 Md.
L. Rev. 85, 87-89 (2003); John D. Johnston, Jr. & Charles L. 
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Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial
Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 675, 676 (1971).  But see
Hernández, supra note 17. 
47 The statistics in Table 3 are derived from Chew & Kelley, 
supra note 7, at 86 tbl.13, and Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, 
app.A, at 594-95.  There was only one case in each study in 
which the plaintiff was identified as Native American.  The 
plaintiff was unsuccessful in both those cases.  For further 
detail on the calculations in Table 3, see note 48.  
48 To illustrate how the author calculated the numbers for Table 
3 for the sexual harassment cases, consider the following. (The 
raw data for the calculations are provided in Juliano & Schwab, 
supra note 24, app.A, at 595.)  To determine the effect of the 
sex of the plaintiff on the plaintiffs’ success rate in sexual 
harassment cases, one adds the number of cases won by female 
plaintiffs at the district court level (464 cases times 50.9% = 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
-88-
236.2) to the number of cases won by female plaintiffs at the 
appellate court level (152 cases times 39.5% = 60) and divides 
that sum by the total number of cases in which the plaintiff is 
female (296.2 divided by 616 = 48.1%).  This formula is repeated 
for the cases in which the plaintiff is a male and the result is 
a 38.2% win rate, etc.    
49 However, male plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases at the 
appellate level have a win rate of only 14.3%.  Id.
50 However, in more recent racial harassment cases, women tend to 
lose more cases than men. Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 103-04 
& fig.7. 
51 See supra note 31 (describing caveat in interpreting race 
data).  
52 Chew & Kelley, supra 7, at 70 tbl.6. 
53 Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, app.A, at 595. 
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54 See Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 70 tbl.6; Juliano & 
Schwab, supra note 24, app.A, at 595. 
55 Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, app.A, at 595. 
56 See Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 86 tbl.13 (finding a 
success rate of approximately 17% in both types of cases). 
57 Id.
58 See id. (plaintiff success rate increases to 32.9%).  
59 See id. at 87-88 & tbl.14.  For instance, plaintiffs are 
successful in 33.3% of their cases when they report harassers’ 
use of ostensibly race-linked objects such as nooses, white 
robes, and pointed hats—compared to an average plaintiffs’ win 
rate of 21.5%.  See id. at 84, 88 tbl.14.  Perhaps what is most 
striking is that plaintiffs still lose two-thirds of the time in 
those cases. 
60 For example, plaintiffs that complain of pornographic 
descriptions and sexual materials left in their private space 
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(such as their desks or lockers) have a significantly higher 
success rate (68% and 67.6% respectively) than the average 
plaintiffs’ success rate of 48.2%.  Juliano & Schwab, supra note 
24, app.A, at 596.  Similarly, plaintiffs who complain of 
physical contact of a sexual nature have a higher success rate 
(55.9%) than plaintiffs who complain of physical contact of a 
nonsexual nature (48.3%).  Id.
61 The Juliano & Schwab study included the universe of cases in 
the designated time period.  Id. at 555-56.  The Chew & Kelley 
study used a stratified random sampling method.  Chew & Kelley, 
supra note 7, at 53-54. 
62 See id. at 81-82, 94-95. 
63 Id. at 62 n.54.    
64 See infra text accompanying notes 104-115 (discussing relevant 
research).  
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65 Aravinda Nadimpalli Reeves, Gender Matters, Race Matters:  A 
Qualitative Analysis of Gender & Race Dynamics in Law Firms 
(June 2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern 
University) (on file with author).  This research is based on 
sixty-five in-depth interviews of African American and White 
attorneys in medium-size and large law firms.  Id. at 60.  There 
are comparable numbers of African American men, African American 
women, White men and White women.  Id. Half of the interviewees 
were randomly selected through attorney directories; the other 
half were referred by other attorneys, i.e., an adapted 
“snowball strategy.”  Id. at 60-64.  
66 See infra text accompanying notes 72-88, 91-103. 
67 Reeves, supra note 65, at 222-23, 225.  
68 Id. at 217-18. 
69 See id. at 218-20.  
70 Id. at 218.  
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71 Id.
72 See id. at 216-47.  
73 See Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Men and Women of the Corporation 
206-42 (1977). 
74 See Reeves, supra note 65, at 216 (summarizing Kanter’s 
theory). 
75 See id. at 219. 
76 Id.
77 Id. at 219-20.  
78 Id. at 220.   
79 Id. at 221. 
80 Id.
81 Kanter, supra note 72, at 230; see Reeves, supra note 65, at 
233-39.  
82 Id. at 233-34.   
83 Id. at 234. 
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84 Id. at 234-35.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 236. 
87 Id.
88 Id. at 233.  
89 Id. at 222-23.   
90 See, e.g., Katherine C. Naff, To Look Like America:  
Dismantling Barriers for Women and Minorities in Government 137-
39 (2001); Reeves, supra note 65, at 222-23. 
91 Reeves, supra note 65, at 151-70.  See Barbara A. Gutek, Sex 
and the Workplace (1985); Barbara A. Gutek & Aaron Groff Cohen, 
Sex Ratios, Sex Role Spillover, and Sex at Work: A Comparison
of Men’s and Women’s Experiences, 40 Human Relations 97 (1987); 
Barbara A. Gutek & Bruce Morasch, Sex-Ratios, Sex-Role
Spillover, and Sexual Harassment of Women at Work, 38 J. Soc. 
Issues, Winter 1982, at 55.  In addition to the sex-role 
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spillover model, Theresa Beiner describes three other major 
social science theories of sexual harassment:  the sociocultural 
or power model (focusing on male dominance), the organizational 
model (emphasizing the role of hierarchical power structures in 
organizations), and the natural/biological model (emphasizing 
biological and evolutionary instincts).  Beiner, supra note 15, 
at 114-32.   
92 Gutek, supra note 91, at 15-18.  Men may also view women 
coworkers as a mother, daughter, sister, or wife, but Reeves’ 
work did not report the spillover of these roles.  Gutek also 
notes that men are subject to sex-role spillover, but men’s 
stereotypes as leader or financial provider do not invite others 
to harass them.  See Gutek, supra note 91, at 15-18.  
93 See Beiner, supra note 15, at 118-19; Gutek, supra note 91, at 
129-51.  
94 Reeves, supra note 65, at 154. 
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95 Id. at 155. 
96 Id. at 160. 
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 See id. at 160-61.   
100 Id. at 161. 
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 A supervisor’s perception of a situation affects not only his 
or her assessment of racial harassment, but also the appropriate 
institutional response.  See Naff, supra note 90, at 135-37.  
105 Id. at 135 (quoting Clayton P. Alderfer et al., Diagnosing 
Race Relations in Management, 16 J. Applied Behavioral Science 
135, 148 (1980)).  
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106 Id.
107 See id. at 146-53.  
108 Naff’s research is based on 6251 employees of color 
responding to a workforce diversity survey.  Id. at 150.  While 
she uses the term “Euro-Americans,” I use the term Whites or 
White Americans in this Article. 
109 Table 4 is a partial reproduction of Naff’s Table 6.3.  Id.
at 147 tbl.6.3.  In contrast to this Article’s Table 4, Naff’s 
table also shows the percentage of each racial group that 
“[n]either agree nor disagree” or “[s]trongly 
disagree/disagree.”  Id.
110 See generally Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the
Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression
Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1258 (1992) 
(describing negative stereotypes of each racial group).  
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111 These writings, for example, describe the history of Asian 
Americans including their experiences of discrimination:  Frank 
H. Wu, Yellow:  Race in America Beyond Black and White (2002); 
Pat K. Chew, Asian Americans: The “Reticent" Minority and Their
Paradoxes, 36 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1 (1994); and Faye K. Cocchiara 
& James Campbell Quick, The Negative Effects of Positive
Stereotypes: Ethnicity-Related Stressors and Implications on
Organizational Health, 25 J. Organizational Behav. 781 (2004)
(suggesting that positive stereotypes, such as Asian Americans 
being stereotyped as the “model minority,” may create adverse 
effects).  
112 See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 110, at 1260-81.   
113 See Naff, supra note 68, at 148-49 tbl.6.4. 
114 Lawrence D. Bobo & Susan A. Suh, Surveying Racial
Discrimination: Analyses from a Multiethnic Labor Market, in
Prismatic Metropolis:  Inequality in Los Angeles (Lawrence D. 
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Bobo, Melvin L. Oliver, James H. Johnson Jr., & Abel Valenzuela, 
Jr. eds., 2000) 523, 529 tbl.14.3.  
115 Id.
116 Id. at 531 tbl.14.4. 
117 Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 71-72.  
118 For example, I teach a seminar at the University of 
Pittsburgh School of Law entitled “Harassment in the Workplace,” 
in which each student selects a form of harassment to study in 
detail.  After their research, the class collaborates as a group 
on commonalities and dissimilarities in the causes, 
manifestations, and legal remedies of the varied forms of 
harassment.  
119 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is directed at both 
racial and sexual harassment.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).  In 
contrast, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, from which §§ 1981 and 
1983 derived, only addressed racial harassment.  See Civil 
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Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 41 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (2000)).  
120 See Beiner, supra note 15, at 23, 211; Reeves, supra note 65, 
at 40-46.  See also sources cited supra note 17.  
121 E.g., Beiner, supra note 15, at 23, 211. 
122 See Reeves, supra note 65, at 168-70. At the same time, Black 
male attorneys describe their bind as individuals with “male 
privilege” yet lack of the protection of “White privilege.” 
 
[African American male - describing an informal 
conversation between male attorneys:]  They get very 
graphic, but most of the time, they are talking about White 
women, and can you imagine the reaction if I were to join 
in on that conversation.  As a Black man, I have to be very 
careful about how I negotiate those conversations. On one 
hand, I am “privileged” because I am being included in the 
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conversation, and inclusion is the name of the game in law 
firms. But on the other hand, if they were to hear a Black 
man talk about these White women in the same way, as sexual 
objects, the perception of that conversation is 
dramatically different.  
 
Id. at 167-68. 
123 Id. at 170.  
124 See sources cited supra note 17.  See also Tara E. Kent, 
Sexual Harassment in a Multicultural Workplace 22-28 (May 2002) 
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Purdue University) (on file with 
author) (summarizing research on sexual harassment of women of 
color).  
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